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SPECIAL TOPIC
Inference without significance: measuring support for
hypotheses rather than rejecting them
Tim Gerrodette
NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries Science Center, La Jolla, CA, USA
‘Null hypothesis testing in the statistical sciences is
like protoplasm in biology; they both served an early
purpose but are no longer very useful’ (Anderson
2008).
Introduction
David Anderson’s comment is part of a long history of
criticism of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST)
by statisticians and statistically minded biologists. Some
colorful comments about NHST procedures are that
they are ‘not a contribution to science’ (Savage 1957), ‘a
serious impediment to the interpretation of data’ (Skipper
et al. 1967), ‘worse than irrelevant’ (Nelder 1985), ‘diffi-
cult to take seriously’ (Chernoff 1986), and ‘completely
devoid of practical utility’ (Finney 1989). The long and
intense criticism does not seem to have had much effect
in ecology. Although use has declined slightly (Fidler
et al. 2006; Hobbs & Hilborn 2006), NHST and its associ-
ated P-value are currently used in over 90% of papers in
ecology and evolution (Stephens et al. 2006).
NHST is based on positing that a certain condition
(the null hypothesis) is true and then calculating the
probability (the P-value) of the observed data, or of
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Abstract
Despite more than half a century of criticism, significance testing continues to
be used commonly by ecologists. Significance tests are widely misused and mis-
understood, and even when properly used, they are not very informative for
most ecological data. Problems of misuse and misinterpretation include: (i)
invalid logic; (ii) rote use; (iii) equating statistical significance with biological
importance; (iv) regarding the P-value as the probability that the null hypothe-
sis is true; (v) regarding the P-value as a measure of effect size; and (vi) regard-
ing the P-value as a measure of evidence. Significance tests are poorly suited
for inference because they pose the wrong question. In addition, most null
hypotheses in ecology are point hypotheses already known to be false, so
whether they are rejected or not provides little additional understanding. Eco-
logical data rarely fit the controlled experimental setting for which significance
tests were developed. More satisfactory methods of inference assess the degree
of support which data provide for hypotheses, measured in terms of informa-
tion theory (model-based inference), likelihood ratios (likelihood inference) or
probability (Bayesian inference). Modern statistical methods allow multiple
data sets to be combined into a single likelihood framework, avoiding the loss of
information that can occur when data are analyzed in separate steps. Inference
based on significance testing is compared with model-based, likelihood and
Bayesian inference using data on an endangered porpoise, Phocoena sinus. All of
the alternatives lead to greater understanding and improved inference than pro-
vided by a P-value and the associated statement of statistical significance.
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unobserved data more extreme, given the hypothesis and
the probability model.1 The basic idea is that an improba-
ble outcome (small P) is reasonable cause to question the
validity of the null hypothesis. The assumption of a null
hypothesis leads to the burden-of-proof issue, because the
null hypothesis remains the accepted condition unless
and until data indicate that it should be rejected. In the
context of conservation or wildlife management, where
data are often limited, the requirement to disprove a null
hypothesis of no effect or no impact can have non-pre-
cautionary implications (Peterman & M’Gonigle 1992;
Taylor & Gerrodette 1993; Dayton 1998; Brosi & Biber
2009).
As currently used, NHST is a combination of ideas
developed in the 1920s and 1930s, primarily by Fisher
(1925) and Neyman & Pearson (1933). Actually, these
and other statisticians had substantially different views
about the nature and role of statistics in the scientific
process. There were vigorous disagreements at the time
(Goodman 1993; Inman 1994; Salsburg 2001) and it is
doubtful that any of them would approve of NHST as it
is practiced today. Fisher’s idea was that the P-value was
an ‘aid to judgment’ about the truth of a hypothesis. A
small P-value meant that the data did not support the
hypothesis, but Fisher was not dogmatic about a 0.05 cut-
off for significance (see Hurlbert & Lombardi 2009 for
changes in Fisher’s thinking), nor did he view the out-
come of any single experiment as decisive. Neyman and
Pearson, on the other hand, explicitly framed the problem
as a decision between two competing hypotheses. Fisher’s
P-value was a flexible measure of evidence, whereas the
Neyman–Pearson test was a rule for behavior which
would minimize the rate (or frequency, hence the term
‘frequentist’) of incorrect decisions. The modern hybrid
NHST combines these ideas by identifying Fisher’s P with
the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate a. The two meth-
ods are fundamentally incompatible, and the result is ‘a
mishmash of Fisher and Neyman-Pearson, with invalid
Bayesian interpretation’ (Cohen 1994). Their combination
‘has obscured the important differences between Neyman
and Fisher on the nature of the scientific method and
inhibited our understanding of the philosophic implica-
tions of the basic methods in use today’ (Goodman
1993).
This paper makes three points: (i) that NHST is widely
misused and misunderstood; (ii) that even when properly
used, NHST is only marginally informative for most eco-
logical data; and (iii) that better methods of inference are
available. The first two points are covered relatively
briefly, as the problems with NHST have long been well
described.2 However, many of the papers are in the statis-
tical, medical and social science literature and may not be
familiar to ecologists. An excellent paper on ‘the insignifi-
cance of significance testing’ for ecologists is Johnson
(1999) (see also Yoccoz 1991; McBride et al. 1993; Ellison
1996; Cherry 1998; Germano 1999; Anderson et al. 2000;
La¨a¨ra¨ 2009). The third point is illustrated by working
through a specific example, showing that alternatives to
NHST can give greater insight and understanding of data.
As in any branch of science, new and improved statisti-
cal methods are constantly being developed. Ecologists
would not use 80-year-old genetic or physiological tech-
niques when more powerful and useful methods are avail-
able. Why don’t we apply the same standards when
drawing conclusions from our data?
Misuse and misunderstanding of NHST
Probably the most pervasive and serious misuse of NHST
is to interpret a P-value as the probability that the null
hypothesis is true. A small P-value, particularly P < 0.05,
is taken to mean that the null hypothesis is false, or at
least likely to be false. A variant of this misinterpretation
is to regard a non-significant result as confirmation of the
null hypothesis. Thus, after finding that P > 0.05, a com-
mon conclusion is something like ‘There is no difference’
or ‘There is no effect’. Another variant, when there is a
clear alternative hypothesis, is to interpret 1 ) P as the
probability that the alternative hypothesis is true. Yet
another variant is that if the null hypothesis is rejected,
the theory or idea that motivated the test must be true.
1This paper primarily addresses a point-null hypothesis,
which posits the strict equality of a parameter (e.g. the
mean) among the groups tested. A point-null hypothesis
is the most common form of NHST in the ecological lit-
erature. Alternatives such as interval and one-sided tests,
which use a similar inferential procedure but posit non-
null hypotheses, are discussed briefly later. Despite the
misnomer, NHST as used here refers generally to infer-
ence conditioned on a hypothesis.
2David Anderson maintains two lists of hundreds of
quotations and citations critical of null hypothesis testing,
one compiled through 1997 by Marks Nester http://warn-
ercnr.colostate.edu/~anderson/nester.html, and another
compiled through 2001 by Bill Thompson http://warn-
ercnr.colostate.edu/~anderson/thompson1.html. An updated
list through 2010 can be found at http://swfsc.noaa.
gov/SignificanceTestRefs. For discussions of informed use
of NHST, see Cox (1977), Harlow et al. (1997), Nickerson
(2000), Guthery et al. (2001), Robinson & Wainer (2002),
McBride (2005), Stephens et al. (2006) and Martı´nez del
Rio et al. (2007).
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In one form or another, all of these misuses involve
regarding the P-value as a statement about the probability
of a hypothesis being true. But P cannot be a statement
about the probability of the truth or falsity of any
hypothesis because the calculation of P is based on the
assumption that the null hypothesis is true. P is the prob-
ability of data (or of data more extreme) conditional on a
hypothesis, not the probability of a hypothesis conditional
on data. This may sound like statistical double-talk
but the difference is fundamental. The probability that
I will encounter a certain species, given that it is rare in
the study area, is quite different from the probability
that the species is rare in the area, given that I have
encountered it.
The common misinterpretation of P as the probability
that the null hypothesis is true is appealing because it
seems logical. Consider the following:
If the hypothesis is true, this observation cannot
occur.
This observation has occurred.
Therefore, the hypothesis is false.
This is a valid syllogism in deductive logic called modus
tollens, or denying the consequent. The logic of NHST is
similar, but the statements are probabilistic:
If the null hypothesis is true, this observation is un-
likely to occur.
This observation has occurred.
Therefore, the null hypothesis is likely to be false.
The structure of the NHST argument is the same, and
the logic seems reasonable. But it is invalid. Why?
Because we have moved from the black-and-white of
deductive logic to the grays of probabilistic inference, and
the rules are different. An example will show the fallacy:
If this person is a chemist, he ⁄ she is unlikely to win
a Nobel Prize in chemistry.
This person has won a Nobel Prize in chemistry.
Therefore, this person is unlikely to be a chemist.
The first statement, while true, is about the proportion
of chemists who win Nobel Prizes. The validity of the
conclusion, however, depends on the proportion of Nobel
Prize winners in chemistry who are chemists, and neither
the data (the second statement) nor the assumptions (the
first statement) say anything about that. We are attempt-
ing to make a statement about the probability of truth of
a statement (that the person is a chemist) using a frame-
work of deductive logic when the situation calls for prob-
abilistic reasoning. In the language of conditional
probabilities, we want the probability of being a chemist
conditional on winning a Nobel Prize in chemistry, not
the probability of winning a Nobel Prize conditional on
being a chemist.
The illogic of NHST has been pointed out many times
before (e.g. Berkson 1942; Rozeboom 1960; Bakan 1966;
Oakes 1986; Cohen 1994; Royall 1997; Goodman 1999;
Trafimow 2003). Despite the faulty logic, the NHST
pseudo-syllogism is alluring and continues as one of the
‘fantasies of statistical significance’ (Carver 1978). A fur-
ther complication is that there are situations where the
logic seems to work perfectly well. Substitute ‘this is a fair
coin’ for ‘this person is a chemist’ and ‘10 ‘‘heads’’ in a
row’ for ‘win a Nobel Prize’ in the argument above, and
everything can seem fine.
Aside from its logical problems, NHST has a subtly
corrosive effect because it permits lazy analysis and
impedes clear thinking. NHST has become so ingrained
and automatic that it is carried out by researchers and is
often required by journal editors with little thought about
what the procedure means or whether it is necessary. ‘Sta-
tistical ‘‘recipes’’ are followed blindly, and ritual has taken
over from scientific thinking’ (Preece 1984). ‘The rituali-
zation of NHST [has been carried] to the point of mean-
ingless and beyond’ (Cohen 1994). Nelder (1985) decried
‘the grotesque emphasis on significance tests’, and Sals-
burg (1985) satirized ‘the religion of statistics’. Statistical
ritual leads to publication of papers that are methodologi-
cally impeccable but contain little actual information
(Guthery 2008).
For example, one result of rote use of NHST is a con-
fusion of statistical significance and biological importance
(Boring 1919; Jones & Matloff 1986). Many ecologists
are familiar with the idea that important biological
effects may exist but not be statistically significant in a
particular study because of small sample size. Calcula-
tions of statistical power can be helpful in this situation
(Gerrodette 1987; Cohen 1988; Urquhart & Kincaid
1999; Gray & Burlew 2007), but power calculations, espe-
cially post hoc, are themselves confusing, misunderstood
and misused (Goodman & Berlin 1994; Steidl et al.
1997). In particular, a power calculation based on the
observed data provides no more information than the
P-value itself (Thomas 1997; Hoenig & Heisey 2001).
Despite the general awareness of possible low power, a
biological effect that is not statistically significant is often
summarily dismissed as unimportant (‘Growth rate was
not significantly related to temperature’) or nonexistent
(‘There was no difference in mean length among
groups’). Effect size may not even be reported, leaving
the reader uninformed about the estimated size of the
biological effect, statistically significant or not. However,
lack of statistical significance does not mean lack of bio-
logical importance.
The converse can also happen – that is, biologically
unimportant effects can be statistically significant if sam-
ple size is large. When samples can be obtained relatively
easily and cheaply (e.g. air, water or, increasingly, genetic
samples), large sample size can lead to detection of trivial
Inference without significance Gerrodette
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differences and ultra-precautionary ‘significant’ results
(McBride 2005). A colleague recently showed me a paper
which examined prey size for two predators, based on a
large sample of stomach contents (Fig. 1A). The authors
had concluded that one predator ate larger prey than the
other, based on a statistically significant difference
(P < 0.001) in median prey length. Looking at Fig. 1A,
does the difference in prey lengths seem ecologically sig-
nificant? Can you even tell which predator eats the larger
prey? The authors had lost sight of the difference between
statistical significance and biological importance.
A less harmful but more mindless use of NHST is to
give a statistical blessing to results that don’t need it.
Another colleague found a large difference in stable d15N
isotope ratios of a predator at two locations (Fig. 1B). An
editor insisted that a significance test for the difference in
isotope ratios between the two locations be carried out
before the paper could be published. Can you believe it?
Do we learn anything by assuming that d15N values at the
two locations were equal (when clearly they were not),
and then calculating that P < 0.0000000000000001? (This
small value is not the probability that the two locations
have equal isotope values, as just explained, although we
tend to think of it that way.)
Significance tests are commonly used in intermediate
steps in an analysis. NHST may be used to decide
whether to pool subsets of data, whether the data can be
considered to follow a certain distribution (goodness-of-
fit tests), and whether a parameter should be retained in
an analysis or dropped because it is ‘not significant’. In
nearly all such applications, lack of statistical significance
is equated with the plausibility of the null hypothesis and
implausibility of the alternative, when in actuality the null
and alternative hypotheses were not resolvable with the
data. For example, using a significance test to determine
if data are normally distributed will reliably lead to the
conclusion that the data are normal if sample size is
small and not normal if sample size is large, an observa-
tion that led Berkson (1938) to an early criticism of
NHST. In addition, multiple testing within an analysis
leads to inflated Type I error rates and many false results,
particularly in stepwise regression (Whittingham et al.
2006; Anderson 2008; Mundry & Nunn 2009).
The P-value is sometimes regarded as a measure of
effect size, so that a small P is taken to indicate a large
(‘significant’) effect. However, P depends on sample size
as well as effect size, and the relationship between P and
effect size can be highly non-linear even with equal sam-
ple sizes. Here is a thought experiment that shows how
these can be confused. Suppose we conduct experiments
designed to measure the effect of two toxins. The experi-
ment with the first toxin has a sample size of 100 and
gives P = 0.01. The experiment with the second toxin has
a sample size of 10 and gives P = 0.07. Which toxin has
the stronger effect? It is tempting to say the first, because
P is lower and significant at the 0.05 level, and sample
size is larger. Actually, however, the results indicate a
stronger effect for the second because, despite the much
smaller sample size, the P-value is still relatively small.
With the usual assumptions of normal distributions and
equal variances, the results indicate that the effect of the
second toxin is q(0.07) ⁄q(0.01)
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
100=10
p ¼ 2:0 times as
large as the first, where q(x) is the standard normal quan-
tile of x. Given the difference in sample sizes, to indicate
an equal toxic effect the P-value of the first experiment
would have to be Uðqð0:07Þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi100=10p Þ ¼ 0:000002, where
F is the standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion. The relationships between P, sample size and effect
size are not simple.
By focusing on the P-value and a sharp boundary
between significance and non-significance, NHST can
hinder rather than help interpretation of data. As Hoenig
& Heisey (2001) conclude: ‘The indirect logic of frequen-
tist hypothesis testing is simply nonintuitive and hard for
most people to understand’.
Marginal utility of NHST
Even if NHST is understood and used properly, the
results are usually not very informative for making infer-
ence with ecological data. As discussed in the previous
section, NHST poses the problem in a way that does not
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Fig. 1. Two unthinking uses of significance
tests. (A) Statistical significance is not the
same as biological significance. A paper
concluded that length of prey was
significantly greater for Predator 1
(P < 0.001). (B) A significance test confirms
the obvious. An editor required a significance
test to show that the two locations had
different d15N stable isotope ratios.
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give the answer that most ecologists need, and that most
ecologists think it gives them. A P-value is the right
answer to the wrong question.3
For example, provided all assumptions have been met,
a P-value for the slope of a regression line indicates
whether the observed relationship between the x and y
variables could have occurred by chance alone. But what
we need to know is how much the data support a slope
of 0 versus a slope that would indicate an important
effect. The NHST approach does not provide a measure
of how improbable a slope of 0 is – that is, no measure
of how strongly chance might be eliminated as an expla-
nation of the data. The P-value itself, as we have seen, is
not such a measure. Similarly, the Type I error rate is a
measure of how frequently the wrong conclusion will be
reached if the null hypothesis is true, and the Type II
error rate provides a similar measure if the alternative
hypothesis is true. However, there is no measure of which
of these two hypotheses, the null or alternative, might be
true. Further, the calculation of P and error rates depends
on unobserved data. Basing conclusions on what might
have been observed, but was not, does not seem the best
way to proceed. What might have been observed may
depend on the intentions of the investigator (Meeks &
D’Agostino 1983; Berger & Berry 1988).
Fisher regarded the P-value as a relative measure of sup-
port, and inference based on P was a reasoned judgment,
neither automatic nor absolute. In modern use, P is usu-
ally interpreted in an absolute sense, so that a small P, say
P < 0.05, is regarded as moderately strong support against
the null hypothesis, and P < 0.01 as strong support. The
P-value has no such absolute meaning because it depends
on the alternatives (Berkson 1938; Oakes 1986; Schervish
1996; Royall 1997). A result with P < 0.05 does not neces-
sarily provide strong support against the null hypothesis
(Edwards et al. 1963; Sterne & Davey Smith 2001). In fact,
results with P = 0.05 are at most weak support, and the
null hypothesis may still have substantial probability, even
>0.5, of being true (Berger & Sellke 1987; Trafimow
2003). Interpreting P as a measure of support generally
overstates the evidence against the null hypothesis
(Goodman 1993), leading to falsely ‘significant’ results.
The NHST approach also leads to a focus on statistical
significance rather than on the size of the biological effect.
Tukey (1969) pointed out that many physical laws would
not have been discovered if physicists had been content
to conclude ‘when you pull on it, it gets longer’. The
amount by which it gets longer is important. Similarly,
the estimated size of the biological effect, such as the
effect of a toxin or the difference in haplotype frequen-
cies, is more informative than the statement that it is
statistically significant or not.
NHST was developed in the context of controlled
experiments. Results of controlled experiments in marine
ecology can be clear and elegant (e.g. Connell 1961; Paine
1966; Dayton 1971; Lubchenco & Menge 1978) but, in
many situations, experiments are not possible. Instead,
ecologists rely on data collected at different times, places
and conditions to infer what processes are important.
Most hypothesis testing in ecology is inductive and
descriptive, not deductive (Quinn & Dunham 1983), so it
is not surprising that NHST is ill-suited for drawing con-
clusions from such data (Johnson 2002; Eberhardt 2003).
Monitoring of abundance, for example, is a common
and important type of observational data. In the experi-
mental framework of NHST, the procedure would be to
decide on the length of the monitoring period, collect
data over this period, and analyze the data for a signifi-
cant trend. For the Type I and II error rates to be accu-
rate, the data may be analyzed only once at the end of
monitoring period. It would not be valid to analyze the
data before the end of the monitoring period or to use
the data again after another point had been added to the
series, at least not without adjusting for multiple testing.
Few ecologists follow such a strict protocol when analyz-
ing monitoring data.
NHST inference is based on assuming that the null
hypothesis is true, but point-null hypotheses are state-
ments already known to be false at some level of preci-
sion (Berkson 1942; Cohen 1994; Johnson 1999).
Consider Fig. 1 again. Is it realistic to hypothesize that
two predators eat exactly the same size of prey, or that
two locations have exactly the same d15N ratio? Does any-
one seriously think that the density of animals does not
change at all from year to year? Or that haplotype fre-
quencies or fatty acid composition are exactly equal
among different populations? Of course not. Because such
hypotheses are known to be false before any data are col-
lected, rejecting them (or not) is a largely meaningless
exercise. The results of NHST tell us little except whether
our sample size was sufficient to detect the differences.
Some modifications of NHST, such as equivalence tests
(Patel & Gupta 1984; McBride et al. 1993; Dixon & Pech-
mann 2005) or significance tests without null hypotheses
(Jones & Tukey 2000), address the vacuity of such
hypotheses, but do not avoid the convoluted logic of
NHST (Camp et al. 2008). They still pose the problem as
a decision conditional on a hypothesis rather than as a
measure of support conditional on data.
NHST encourages a dichotomous decision to either
accept or reject the null hypothesis. Such a procedure is
both unrealistic and unhelpful in most scientific situations,
3I owe this phrasing to Daniel Goodman, Montana
State University.
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including ecology (Quinn & Dunham 1983; Cohen 1994;
Germano 1999; Johnson 1999). Few observations or exper-
iments lead to complete falsification of a meaningful
hypothesis. Platt (1964) argued that science could advance
rapidly by posing and testing mutually exclusive hypothe-
ses. In ecology, however, where confounding factors and
multiple interacting causes are to be expected, the notion
of mutually exclusive hypotheses is often inappropriate.
Most ecological data provide evidence that, taken in the
context of previous work, either increase or decrease sup-
port for an idea incrementally. What we really want to
know is the degree to which new data change such sup-
port, or, if there are competing hypotheses, the degree to
which data support one hypothesis over another. NHST
does not provide such answers.
More satisfactory methods of inference measure the
degree of support for hypotheses. Evaluating the consis-
tency of a hypothesis with data is more direct and infor-
mative than the other way around. Hilborn & Mangel
(1997) use the metaphor of a detective searching for
answers (support for hypotheses) given clues (data). As
Good (1992) put it, ‘We need methods for estimating the
probability that a hypothesis contains some truth’ – what
we might call the ‘truthiness’ of a hypothesis.4
Comparison of methods of inference using
vaquita (Phocoena sinus) data
In this section, we compare NHST with model-based,
likelihood and Bayesian inference using data on the vaq-
uita, Phocoena sinus, also called the Gulf of California or
desert porpoise (Rojas-Bracho et al. 2006). This small
cetacean, endemic to a limited area in the Northern Gulf
of California, Mexico, is on the brink of extinction,
mainly due to bycatch in artisanal fishing nets (Rojas-Bra-
cho & Taylor 1999; see also http://www.vaquita.tv). Vaqu-
itas are listed as Critically Endangered by the IUCN, as
well as endangered by both Mexico and the USA. This
example was chosen because the data are relatively simple,
and the comparison of data from two groups (e.g. treat-
ment and control) is one of the most basic uses of statis-
tics. The example also shows the critical role of inference
in conservation and management. Because restrictions on
fishing to protect vaquitas may have economic impacts
on fishers, managers are reluctant to take action unless
there is strong evidence that vaquitas are declining in
abundance.
Joint US-Mexican line-transect surveys were carried out
in 1997 and 2008 to estimate vaquita abundance. For
simplicity, we consider a subset of the data collected with
the same methods (sightings using 25· binoculars) on the
same ship (David Starr Jordan) in the same area (the spe-
cies’ core area described in Jaramillo-Legorreta et al.
1999) in both years. The point estimates of abundance
were 409 (SE = 250) in 1997 (Jaramillo-Legorreta et al.
1999, Table 1, with SE computed from CV) and 179
(SE = 74) in 2008 (using methods described in Gerro-
dette et al. 2011 applied to the 1997 core area). The ques-
tion of primary interest is whether vaquita abundance
declined during the 11-year period between the two sur-
veys. Although the 2008 point estimate (179) was less
than half the 1997 point estimate (409), standard errors
were large. There is a large overlap of the 95% lognormal
confidence intervals for the two estimates (Fig. 2A), so
there is uncertainty whether a decrease in abundance
actually took place. R code for the analysis of the vaquita
data is provided in Supporting Information Appendix S1.
Frequentist inference
First, we use a standard NHST approach. Given the esti-
mates and their standard errors and assuming indepen-
dence, a Wald test can be used to test the significance of
the difference between the 1997 and 2008 estimates:
z ¼ d^
s^d
¼ N^1997  N^2008ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
var N^1997
 þ var N^2008
 q
¼ 409  179ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2502 þ 742
p ¼ 230
261
¼ 0:88
where s^ is the estimated standard error. From the stan-
dard normal distribution, P = 0.38 for this z value or lar-
ger (two-tailed). Thus, the null hypothesis that 1997 and
2008 abundance was equal is not rejected. In the indirect
logic of NHST, P = 0.38 does not mean 1997 and 2008
vaquita abundance was equal, but it does mean that the
data were not inconsistent with that assumption. The
burden of proof is to show that abundance changed, and
the data were not sufficiently improbable to do that. It is
frequently emphasized that failing to reject the null
hypothesis does not mean that the null hypothesis is true,
but when a decision has to be made, this is a distinction
without a difference. The practical consequence is that we
act as if there was no decline in vaquita abundance.
As an alternative to NHST, many papers suggest
approaching the data as an estimation problem rather than
4‘Truthiness’ would be a descriptive word in this con-
text but unfortunately for science, it already has been
given another meaning. American political comedian Ste-
phen Colbert coined truthiness to describe something
known to be true intuitively ‘from the gut’, without
regard to logic or data. Truthiness was Merriam-Webster
Word of the Year for 2006.
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as a hypothesis-testing problem (e.g. Jones 1955; Gardner &
Altman 1986; Nakagawa & Cuthill 2007). In other
words, the primary goal is to estimate effect size and a
measure of its uncertainty, such as a confidence interval,
not to test the null hypothesis of no change. For the vaquita
data, the effect of interest is the change in abundance,
d = N2008 ) N1997. One estimate of d is the difference of
the two point estimates, N^2008  N^1997 ¼ 230, where the
negative value indicates that the change was a decrease. The
key question is, how certain are we of this estimate? If we
assume a normal distribution with standard deviation 261,
as computed in the Wald test above, the 95% confidence
interval for d extends from )741 to +281 (Fig. 2B). The
confidence interval includes 0, which represents the null
hypothesis that 1997 and 2008 vaquita abundance was the
same.
Confidence intervals and NHST are both frequentist
procedures, and they are closely related: if the null
hypothesis of no difference is not rejected at the a level,
then the 1 ) a confidence interval will include 0. Thus,
computing a confidence interval does not lead to a differ-
ent conclusion than NHST about the statistical signifi-
cance of the results. It does, however, focus attention on
the quantity of interest, and thus is more informative
than simply reporting a P-value. Looking at Fig. 2B, one
is less likely to misstate the NHST result as ‘there was no
decline in abundance’. The estimated decline is 230 ani-
mals, not 0, although the confidence interval about the
estimated decline is large and includes 0. In the case of
the thought experiment with two toxins, computing and
reporting effect sizes would make it clear that the esti-
mated effect of the second toxin was larger. When there
are three or more estimates to be compared simulta-
neously, a significance test does have the advantage that it
gives the overall Type I error rate of falsely rejecting the
null hypothesis, a rate not easily shown by confidence
intervals.
Confidence intervals, like P-values, are widely misun-
derstood. Many biologists interpret the 95% confidence
interval to mean that we are ‘95% confident’ that the true
value is in the interval – for example, the probability is
0.95 that the true change in vaquita abundance is between
the upper and lower limits of the vertical line in Fig. 2B.
This interpretation of a confidence interval is natural and
intuitive but, unfortunately, incorrect. A confidence inter-
val is not that kind of probability interval, which is why
Neyman chose a different word for the concept. Rather,
calculating a 95% confidence interval is a procedure
which, on average, will include the true value ‘95% of the
time’. However, the ‘time’ over which this probability
applies is the set of all possible realizations of the data,
whereas we are interested in the probability that applies
to the data we actually have (Goodman 2004b). Like
NHST, a confidence interval is a rule for behavior which
performs well in a hypothetical long run of data. It does
not say anything about the probability of including the
true value or of making the correct decision for the data
we presently have.
Inference conditional on data
Next we consider methods of reaching conclusions which
are conditional on the data, rather than conditional on a
hypothesis. Unlike NHST, these methods indicate the
degree of support for the hypothesis that vaquitas
decreased in abundance. The degree of support can be
measured in terms of likelihood ratios (likelihood infer-
ence), probability (Bayesian inference) or information
theory (model-based inference). For discussion of other
alternatives, see Good (1992), Lecoutre et al. (2001) and
Berger (2003). We also consider two approaches to the
data. In the first approach, analysis proceeds in three
steps: (i) estimate 1997 abundance, (ii) estimate 2008
abundance, and (iii) compare the two estimates. Inference
about change in abundance (the third step) is based on
the results of the first two, as in the Wald test above.
However, the estimates and their standard errors are
summaries of the original data, and some information is
lost. In the second approach, we use the original data to
estimate abundance and infer change in abundance in a
single integrated analysis. Combining data into a single
analysis leads to improved inference (Goodman 2004a).
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Fig. 2. Frequentist inference for vaquita
(Phocoena sinus) data. (A) Point estimates and
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Inference based on summarized data
We assume that line-transect analyses (Buckland et al.
2001) of the 1997 and 2008 data have already been car-
ried out to estimate vaquita abundance in each year.
Inference about change in abundance is based on the
resulting estimates N^1997 ¼ 409, s^1997 ¼ 250, N^2008 ¼ 179
and s^2008 ¼ 74, where s^ is the standard error of the esti-
mate.
Likelihood inference
Likelihood inference uses the evidence provided by data
to compare two hypotheses (Royall 1997; Taper & Lele
2004). Likelihood is the relative support that the data
provide for different values of a parameter. For the vaqui-
ta data, because each value of d = N2008 ) N1997 could be
produced by different combinations of N2008 and N1997
(e.g. a change of d = )200 could be produced by
N2008 = 200, N1997 = 400, by N2008 = 199, N1997 = 399,
etc.), there is a joint likelihood of two parameters, d and
abundance in one of the years, say 1997. Continuing with
the assumption of lognormal error distribution (Fig. 2A),
we use the lognormal distribution to compute the joint
likelihood L of d and N1997 given the data as
Lðd; N1997jdataÞ ¼ lnormðN1997jN^1997; s^1997 Þ
 lnormðN1997 þ dj N^2008; s^2008Þ
where lnorm(x | a,b) is the lognormal probability density
of x given mean a and standard deviation b. We compute
the product because we want the probability of jointly
observing the 1997 and 2008 data, and we assume data
from the 2 years are independent.
The joint likelihood L may be plotted as a function of
its two parameters, the change in abundance d and vaqui-
ta abundance in 1997 N1997. The likelihood surface has a
diagonal ridge, indicating that the likelihoods of d and
N1997 are negatively correlated (Fig. 3A). Our focus is to
judge support for change in abundance d; N1997 is a
so-called nuisance parameter, a parameter of secondary
interest which is necessary to estimate in order to make
inference on the parameter of primary interest, d. There
are various ways to obtain the likelihood of a parameter of
interest which is influenced by other parameters (Royall
1997, Chap. 7). A common method is to use, for each
value of d, the maximum of the likelihoods computed
over all values of N1997 (Fig. 3B). This is called the profile
likelihood because it is the profile of the likelihood surface
viewed from the d axis. The mean of this function is near
)230, as expected, but the maximum is at d = )113.
Given the likelihood of d (Fig. 3B), inference can be
based on the ratio of the likelihoods of any two values of
d. For example, the likelihood ratio against the hypothesis
of no change is L(d = )113) ⁄L(d = 0) = 0.0000156 ⁄
0.0000109 = 1.44 (ratio of heights of vertical dotted lines
in Fig. 3B). A likelihood ratio of 1.44 means the data pro-
vide more evidence for a change of )113 vaquitas than
for a change of 0, but only weakly so.
Inference could also be based on the range of d values
for which the data provide evidence of a given strength.
Royall (1997, p. 11–12) suggests, for example, that a like-
lihood ratio of 8 could be interpreted as moderate evi-
dence, intuitively equivalent to the ratio of evidence in
favor of a two-headed coin over a fair coin when 3
(23 = 8) consecutive heads have been observed. A likeli-
hood interval of d values for which there is this degree of
support extends from )666 to +142 (horizontal gray line
in Fig. 3B). Values of d inside this interval have likeli-
hood ratios >1 ⁄ 8 and values outside this interval have
likelihood ratios <1 ⁄ 8.
Bayesian inference
In the Bayesian system, knowledge of an unknown quan-
tity, such as N1997, N2008 or d, is represented by a probabil-
ity distribution (Gelman et al. 2004; Link & Barker 2010).
Prior to the data, there is a state of knowledge about each
unknown quantity, called the prior distribution, and after
considering the data, there is a new state of knowledge,
–1500 –1000 –500 0 500
Change in abundance
Li
ke
lih
oo
d
0
0.
00
00
05
0.
00
00
15
200
600
1000
1400
–1500 –1000 –500 0 500
0
0.000005
0.00001
0.000015
19
97
 A
bu
nd
an
ce
Change in abundance
Li
ke
lih
oo
dA B
Fig. 3. Likelihood inference for
d = N2008 ) N1997, the change in vaquita
abundance between 1997 and 2008, for
summarized data. (A) Joint likelihood surface
of d and N1997. (B) Profile likelihood of d. The
horizontal gray line is the 1 ⁄ 8 likelihood
interval. The dotted vertical lines indicate the
maximum likelihood at d = )113 and the
likelihood at d = 0.
Gerrodette Inference without significance
Marine Ecology 32 (2011) 404–418 Published 2011. This article is a US Government work and is in the public domain in the USA. 411
called the posterior distribution. The data change, or
update, the state of knowledge. Likelihood connects the
prior to the posterior. Conceptually, this may be written
posterior ¼ prior  likelihood=C
where C is a normalizing constant to ensure that the pos-
terior distribution sums to 1, as a probability distribution
should. The posterior, therefore, is determined only to a
proportionality constant. In the results below, we scale
posterior distributions to their maximum values in order
to compare different posteriors conveniently. If the prior
is informative (that is, if we have some previous informa-
tion), the posterior is a combination of what was previ-
ously known and what the data contribute via the
likelihood function. On the other hand, if the prior is not
informative in the context of the model, the posterior is
proportional to the likelihood.
For the vaquita data, we could proceed with d and
N1997 as in the likelihood inference calculation in the
previous section, but to illustrate the use of prior infor-
mation in a Bayesian context, we consider the probability
distributions of N1997 and N2008, and compute
d = N2008 ) N1997 as a derived parameter. The joint pos-
terior distribution of N1997 and N2008 is
PrðN1997; N2008jdataÞ ¼ PrðN1997; N2008Þ
 LðN1997; N2008jdataÞ=C
where Pr(x,y) is the joint probability of x and y. The joint
lognormal likelihood given the data, L(N1997, N2008 |
data), is computed in the same manner as the joint likeli-
hood in Likelihood inference, and represents the evidence
provided by the data. The new term is Pr(N1997, N2008),
the joint prior distribution, which is peculiar to the
Bayesian approach.
We initially assume a uniformly flat surface for the
joint prior, which means that we assume all values of
N1997 and N2008 are equally probable in each year, and
that there is no correlation between them.5 The result is
the joint posterior probability distribution of N1997
and N2008 shown in Fig. 4. The marginal posteriors of
N1997 and N2008 are obtained by integrating the joint pos-
terior for each variable (Fig. 5A). The distribution of
d = N2008 ) N1997 can be obtained by sampling the joint
posterior distribution.6 As expected with uniform priors
in this simple case, the posterior of d (Fig. 5B) is similar
to the likelihood of d (Fig. 3B), with a mean of )225 and
a maximum value at d = )94. They are not exactly the
same shape because Fig. 3B is a profile of the likelihood
function, whereas Fig. 5B is proportional to the marginal
integral of the likelihood function.
Despite the similarity in shape of Figs 3B and 5B, there
is an important conceptual difference: the posterior is
a probability distribution, whereas the likelihood is
not. This has consequences for inference. A probability
distribution is an absolute measure of support, but likeli-
hood ratios (and, later, information-theoretic differences)
provide relative measures of support among two or more
hypotheses. We can compute an interval which has a
probability of 0.95 of including the true value, i.e. what
many people incorrectly think a 95% confidence interval
is giving them. Posterior probability intervals are also
called credibility intervals. A central 95% probability
interval for the change in vaquita abundance extends
from )864 to +111 (horizontal gray line in Fig. 5B).
The central 95% probability interval contains equal
probabilities in the upper and lower tails of the distribu-
tion, but other intervals may be used. The shortest inter-
val is called the highest posterior density interval. We can
also compute Pr(d < 0) = 0.88, that is, the probability of
a decrease of any amount (fraction of the area under the
curve to the left of the vertical dotted line in Fig. 5B).
Another informative statistic is the odds of a decrease
Pr(d < 0) ⁄Pr(d > 0) = 0.88 ⁄ 0.12 @ 7. In other words, it is
seven times more probable that vaquita abundance
decreased than that it increased.
A useful but sometimes controversial feature of Bayes-
ian methods is the use of prior information. It is useful
because additional information from previous or related
studies can be brought seamlessly into the analysis for
stronger inference. It can be controversial because conclu-
sions may depend not on current data alone, but on a
combination of current data and additional information
brought from other studies. Here we will not discuss the
issue but simply illustrate the use of informative priors
and show that they modify the posteriors.
5Uniform priors are sometimes assumed to be nonin-
formative. However, all priors contain information, and
uniform priors can be informative. In the present case,
some values of N1997 and N2008 should certainly be con-
sidered more probable than others a priori, and the
assumption of no correlation between them implies some
unreasonable possible rates of population increase. Given
the data of this particular example, these issues are of lit-
tle consequence as there is virtually no posterior support
in these regions.
6Other functions of N1997 and N2008 could be com-
puted from the joint posterior. For example, we could
base inference on the ratio r = N2008 ⁄N1997 instead of on
the difference d = N2008 ) N1997. In that case, r > 1
would indicate an increase in abundance, r < 1 a
decrease, and r = 1 the hypothesis of no change.
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Prior to the 1997 survey, there was some knowledge of
vaquita abundance based on previous partial surveys in
the area (Barlow et al. 1997). Likewise, prior to the 2008
survey, there were indications that the population could
be as small as 150, based on increased fishing effort and
the bycatch rate in gillnets (Jaramillo-Legorreta et al.
2007). For the sake of this example, we do not attempt a
detailed analysis, ignore some issues of independence, and
simply assume reasonable prior means of 600 and 150 for
1997 and 2008, respectively, with large uncertainty
(CV = 100%), based on these previous data. With these
informative lognormal priors, the marginal posteriors of
N1997 and N2008 (Fig. 6A) are narrower and slightly differ-
ent in position than the posteriors with uniform priors
(Fig. 5A). The posterior of d (Fig. 6B) is also narrower
than the previous estimation (Fig. 5B). As a result, the
central 95% probability interval is smaller, from )622 to
+51 (horizontal gray line in Fig. 6B), the probability of a
decrease Pr(d < 0) = 0.93 is larger (fraction of area under
the curve to the left of the vertical dotted line in Fig. 6B),
and the odds of a decrease 0.93 ⁄ 0.07 @ 13 are higher.
These differences are due to the additional information
brought to the analysis in the priors.
In either case, the results of Bayesian analyses are
somewhat different than the conclusions of the previous
frequentist and likelihood analyses of the summarized
data. The odds that vaquita abundance decreased between
1997 and 2008 are moderately strong – 13 or 7, depend-
ing on whether we want to base inference on the addi-
tional data in the priors or not.
Inference based on original data
The original line-transect data were the number of km
surveyed each year, the number of vaquita sightings each
year, and group size and distance from the trackline for
each sighting. There are five parameters to estimate
instead of two: d, N1997, g, f1997 and f2008, where the latter
three are additional nuisance line-transect parameters
needed to estimate abundance in each year. Because stan-
dard line-transect software (Thomas et al. 2010) uses a
combination of likelihood and non-likelihood methods,
we use the full likelihood approach of Eguchi & Gerro-
dette (2009) to compare methods of inference. See Gerro-
dette et al. (2011) for more details of the application to
these data.
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Likelihood inference
The five-dimensional joint likelihood equivalent of
Fig. 3A would be difficult to plot, but our focus is on d,
the change in abundance. The profile likelihood of d
based on original data (Fig. 7A) is narrower than the
profile likelihood based on summarized data (Fig. 3B).
The maximum likelihood estimate is d = )224 vaquitas,
and the likelihood ratio against a change of 0 is
L(d = )224) ⁄L(d = 0) = 2.5 · 108. This is extremely
strong evidence that vaquita abundance decreased, intui-
tively equivalent to the strength of evidence in favor of a
two-headed coin over a fair coin when log2(2.5 · 108) =
24.6 consecutive heads have been observed. The 1 ⁄ 8 like-
lihood interval extends from )840 to )168 (horizontal
gray line in Fig. 7A).
Bayesian inference
For the integrated Bayesian analysis, uniform priors were
used for all parameters except g (Gerrodette et al. 2011).
The posterior of d (Fig. 7B) is much narrower than the
posterior based on summarized data with uniform priors
(Fig. 5B), and all of the probability density is less than
zero. The maximum probability occurs at a change of
d = )220 vaquitas, the median value at d = )313, and
the central 95% probability interval extends from )707 to
)175. The probability of a decrease is Pr(d < 0)
> 0.9999999, and the odds of a decrease are Pr(d <
0) ⁄ Pr(d > 0) = 1.8 · 109.
Model-based inference
Inference can be based on model selection (Burnham &
Anderson 2002; Anderson 2008). We compare a model
with a parameter for change in abundance d to a model
without such a parameter. The relative support for the
two models is measured by the difference in Akaike’s
Information Criterion (AIC). For the model with a
change in abundance,
AICd ¼ 2 logðLð~d; ~N1997;~g;~f 1997;~f 2008jdataÞÞ þ 2  5
¼ 635:40
whereas for the model without a change in abundance,
which has only four parameters,
AICd ¼ 2 logðLð~N;~g;~f 1997;~f 2008jdataÞÞ þ 2  4
¼ 667:51
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Likelihood L is computed at the maximum likelihood
estimates ~h of the parameters. The AIC difference between
the models is DAIC = 32.1. An AIC difference of 3
already indicates much less support, so a difference of
32.1 indicates very little support for the no-change-
in-abundance model. Support can also be judged in terms
of model weights. The Akaike weights of the two models are
wd ¼ 1=ð1 þ e32:1=2Þ ¼ 0:9999999
and
wd ¼ e32:1=2=ð1 þ e32:1=2Þ ¼ 0:0000001
again indicating very strongly that vaquita abundance
decreased between 1997 and 2008.
Conclusion
Different methods of statistical inference use different
metrics and can give quantitatively and qualitatively dif-
ferent results (Table 1). Support for a hypothesis can be
measured in terms of information theory, likelihood
ratios or probability. The concept of likelihood conditional
on data is central to inference, although model-based,
likelihood and Bayesian inference use likelihood in differ-
ent ways. Modern statistical methods allow multiple types
of data to be combined into a single analysis for improved
inference. In the case of the vaquita data, there was a sub-
stantial loss of information when summarized data (esti-
mates and standard errors) were used to infer change in
abundance. Integrated analyses based on the original data
had less uncertainty (Fig. 7) and indicated much stronger
support for the conclusion that there was a decrease in
abundance (Table 1). All of the alternatives to NHST were
more informative about ‘what the data say’ than the
P-value and its associated significance.
Fifty years ago, Rozeboom (1960) wrote that his criti-
cism of NHST was ‘not a particularly original view’, and
that ‘the traditional null-hypothesis procedure has already
been superceded [sic] in modern statistical theory by a
variety of more satisfactory inferential techniques’. Fifty
years on, would that this were so.
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